



The World Bank's comprehensive report on sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA), offers both a diagnosis of this
area's problems as well as policy suggestions so as to
overcome these problems and accelerate growth. This
document makes important contributions to the
debate on development issues, with special reference
to Africa, but it suffers from a number of weaknesses.
My criticism will focus on three different levels:
a) forecast of the international environment; b) implicit
belief in the existence of a coherent, 'correct' body of
economic thinking, from which optimum policies can
be deduced; c) insufficient consideration of the
experience of other countries, which were in the l970s
already following policy packages similar to those
being recommended by the Report for SSA as a whole.
I shall draw, in particular, on the experience of the
Southern Cone of Latin America, as countries in this
region have pursued with great consistency and
determination the type of policies (eg 'opening up')
which the Report advocates.
Forecast of the international environment
The forecast for the international environment
implicit in the Report makes two basic mistakes. One
is its excessive optimism. Another is its exaggerated
emphasis, stemming from insufficient analysis of the
international environment as a whole, on the impact
which the price of oil will have on future international
prospects.
The excessive optimism of the Report is implicit in
some of its aid projections [World Bank 1981: Table
9.2]. Thus, even the low aid projection, (which implies
an annual growth rate in real terms of 2.2 per cent for
ODA flows in the 1980-90 period), may unfortunately
be too optimistic in the present international
economic and politiçal environment. The high aid
projection (which would imply an annual growth rate
in real terms of 6.4 per cent for ODA flows in the
1980s) is currently extremely unrealistic. As many of
the ensuing policy recommendations (ie of policies
towards lowering tariff barriers) can be justified only if
accompanied by large flows of aid, excessively
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optimistic aid projections are not only inaccurate, but
are potentially very misleading.
Perhaps even more importantly, the Report's
projections for growth in world trade for the 1980s are
also too optimistic. Projections [World Bank 1981:
Table 3.4] that the volume of world trade in 22 non-
fuel commodities of greatest importance to Africa,
will increase by 2.9 per cent per annum during the
l980s (which is substantially higher than the 1.5 per
cent annual growth for African non-fuel primary
products in the l970s) seem particularly unrealistic,
given developments in world trade over l98082.t
Again, such optimistic projections of growth in world
trade are not only inaccurate, but are conducive to
policy recommendations which place greater emphasis
on export-led growth than the objective situation
would recommend.
As Professor Lewis has pointed out [Lewis 1980]
development theory has clearly lagged behind world
trade trends since World War II. In the 1950s and early
l960s world trade was growing very rapidly.
Influenced by the poor performance of trade in the
inter-war period, however, economists stressed
theories of development (eg 'two-gap model',
structural inflation) which made more sense if world
trade was stagnant. Only in the late l960s was the
rapid growth of world trade clearly perceived, leading
to increasing emphasis on export-led development
strategies. This emphasis was even greater during the
1970s, although the growth in world trade had by then
practically halved. Export-led growth is an even less
attractive proposition if world trade continues to grow
at a mere one per cent per annum as it has during 1980
and 1981.
The Report attributes too much significance to the
price of oil, as the main variable which determines the
It should be stressed that Africa was not alone in having such low
growth in its 'non-fuel' primary exports during the 1970s.
According to UNCTAD estimates published in the 1982 Trade
and Development Report, between 197 1-73 and 1977-79 the
average annual growth in these exports for all non-oil exporting
developing countries was a mere 1.5 per cent. The record for the
1980-82 period is even bleaker.
evolution of the international environment. Thus, its
analysis of 'Prospects for the 1980s' begins as follows:
'the 1980s should be somewhat more favourable for
African oil importers than the recent past. Much
depends on the future path of oil prices, which is
highly uncertain.. .' [World Bank 198 1:22]. It would
seem more accurate to say that, for SSA countries (as
well as for others) much depends on the future
evolution of the international environment, which is
highly uncertain. The link between the level at which
oil prices are set and the international environment are
much more complex than the Report implies.
Undoubtedly the rise in oil prices in the 1970s
contributed to a serious deterioration in the
international environment for less developed countries
(ldcs) reflected in a deterioration in their trade
balance. However, it is by no means clear that lower
oil prices (or even a decline in real terms) in the l980s
will automatically lead to any improvement in the
international position of SSA countries, even though
it should obviously help to cut the import bill of oil-
importing developing countries. In fact, it is
increasingly evident that the very poor growth
performance of the world economy, at least in the
early 1980s, owes at least as much (if not more) to
monetarist policies which are being pursued by the
major industrial countries as to the direct impact of
the 1979 oil price rise [see UNCTAD 1982 for a fuller
discussion].
Finally, as regards projections of oil prices, like so
many other forecasts of oil prices which were made in
the late 1970s and early l980s, the Accelerated
Development Report has clearly over-estimated
increases during the 1980s. An estimated three per cent
annual increase in real terms for this decade is clearly
too high and quite inconsistent with recent
developments. Given the uncertainties which surround
the future price of oil (and the very poor track record
of recent forecasts), it seems doubtful that single
forecasts for the price of oil, as adopted in the Report,
have any value at all. In effect they serve only to
project a false image of accuracy.2
The existence of 'correct' economic thinking
Following a trend relatively common to many reports
written by members of international financial
institutions the Accelerated Development Report
makes categorical policy proposals as if there were a
coherent, 'correct' body of theoretical economic
thought, rooted firmly in empirical evidence, which
formed the basis of its proposals.
2Similarly, the Accelerated Development Report uses an excessively
optimistic projection for African primary export prices in the
1980s without developing alternative more pessimistic pro-
jections.
In fact, the theoretical economic thinking the Report
uses is by no means undisputed, either for less
developed or industrial countries. As is widely known,
even the more advanced industrial economies have
been suffering from stagnation, combined with
inflation during the last decade. The efforts of
different governments to overcome these problems
(either by following pure neo-classical prescriptions or
adopting more pragmatic approaches) have been, on
the whole, unsuccessful. 'Socialist' industrial countries
also face serious economic problems (many of them
similar to those of capitalist economies) and have been
unable to find clear-cut policy solutions. As a
consequence, within each country developed and less
developed as well as internationally, the debate on
economic analysis and policy remains wide open. A
recent report to the Group of Twenty-Four clearly
makes this point:
it is often assumed that the analysis on which policy
judgements are based can itself be made reasonably
objective and relatively free of controversy.
Unfortunately, this is far from the case. Economic
analysis has never acquired the precision of the
natural sciences, and the issues between rival
schools have not even been narrowed over the
years. On the contrary, the range of expert opinion
on questions of economic policy is, f anything, wider
today than at any time in the present century.
[UNDP/UNCTAD 1981] - author's emphasis.
A similar comment made in the Introduction of the
Accelerated Development Report and particularly a
greater awareness of these issues throughout would
have been desirable.
If a more eclectic approach had been taken, general
diagnosis and somewhat simplistic across-the-board
policy prescriptions could have been avoided. That the
diagnosis is excessively general is evident where the
Report states that:
it is now widely evident that the public sector (in
SSA) is over-extended, given the present scarcities
of financial resources, skilled manpower and
organisational capacity. This has resulted in slower
growth than might have been achieved with
available resources, and accounts in part for the
current crisis. [World Bank 198 1:5]
Although specific sections of the Report which suggest
ways of improving the efficiency of the state sector are
undoubtedly of great value, sweeping statements and
the policy to which these give rise clearly do not
correspond either to 'objective' economic analysis or
to categorical empirical evidence, and are therefore
misleading. The Report assumes that in mixed
economies the expansion of the government sector
beyond a certain level inevitably diverts resources
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from the private sector. Hence the rate of growth of
productivity of the economy as a whole tends to be
depressed. This argument is based on the belief that
growth in the productivity of private sector
production of traded goods and services is more rapid
than in the public sector and other sectors producing
non-trading goods and services, where the absence of
market mechanisms and/or of international com-
petition raises questions about the efficiency of
resource use.
This type of reasoning, whether explicit or implicit, is
based upon a number of questionable assumptions.
The most important of these is that the public sector
competes with the private sector not only in the sense
of pre-empting supplies of scarce inputs, but also by
generating outputs that substitute for private sector
outputs. It is, however, clear that public sector output
is to a large extent complementary to that of the
private sector, and is often indispensable to it. In cases
of complementarity, in particular, a shift of resources
out of the public sector would in fact slow down
productivity growth in the private sector and/or
impede the production of certain goods and services in
that economy. This is well illustrated by the experience
of Chile since 1973, where the 'magic of the market
forces' has been released by cutting back on public
sector expenditure. One effect of this can be seen in the
reduction of certain crucial services (such as road
building and maintenance). This has involved both a
reduction in the welfare of individuals and the
productivity of the private sector. It is feared that if
similar types of measures are applied in African
economies (where the services provided by the state
- particularly in respect of education, health and
water - are perhaps even more crucial and
irreplaceable than in the more sophisticated economies
of Latin America) the damage would be potentially
much more serious.3
As pointed out above, these criticisms do not conflict
with the measures suggested in the Report to improve
the efficiency of the state sector and/or parastatals.
These reforms and others which are designed to
improve efficiency may be long overdue.4 Nevertheless
criticism of the Report's insistence on a reduction (or
slower growth) in government administered activities
is justified, because this prescription is based on
dubious assumptions. Last, but not least, it should be
stressed that decisions concerning the size of the public
sector are basically of a national political nature,
'It is true that in SSA an important part of the subsistence peasant
economy, particularly in the mere remote areas, is little affected
by government services. I thank Dudley Seers for suggesting this
point.
4Elsewhere [Griffith-Jones 1981a] I have argued for the particular
need which socialist economies (or those with a large state sector)
have for relatively prudent monetary and financial policies as
well as satisfactory financial results in state enterprises.
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although international financial institutions are of
course free to offer their advice. The tone of the Report
does not make this point sufficiently clear. It takes the
liberty, for example, of recommending the transfer of
education and health to the private sector. These are
areas where decisions surely need to be taken at a
national level, according to the priorities of those
wielding power.
The experience of Latin America's Southern Cone
In its diagnosis of the causes behind the malfunctioning
of the economies of SSA and in its policy proposals,
important parallels may be drawn between the
Report's analysis of SSA countries and the analysis of
ultra-orthodox economists in the Southern Cone of
Latin America. As the latter have been dominant in
influencing economic policy since the mid-1970s in
this region (particularly in Chile, where such economic
teams are generally known as 'the Chicago boys'), it is
relevant to examine briefly the impact of their analysis
and policies.5
Naturally lessons cannot be mechanically transferred
from the experience of one continent to another. In
particular several of the SSA countries have an
important subsistence sector (in which very little, if
any, economic activity is carried out on a commercial
basis). The comments which follow are therefore of far
greater relevance to those sectors of the SSA
economies which are relatively more clearly integrated
into the national and/or world market and which are
also more affected by government activity. Indeed, it
seems a further limitation of the Report that it does
not distinguish sufficiently between the sectors of the
economy more closely integrated into the market and
those which are more isolated from it; nor does the
Report stress sufficiently the important limitations of
statistics for macro-economic aggregates, such as
national income, in economies with large subsistence
sectors. However, in spite of these important
structural differences between the economies of SSA
and those of the Southern Cone of Latin America, it
seems important to examine here the contradictions
emerging clearly from policy packages in the Southern
Cone of Latin America, which are likely to repeat
themselves in other contexts.
Ultra-orthodox economists in Chile - as well as in the
rest of Latin America - have been very critical of the
import substitution industrialisation model which has
been pursued since the 1930s [see eg Ministry of
5The impact of ultra-orthodox policies in Latin America (as well
as in other Third World countries) is examined in more detail in
"Monetarism": its effects on developing countries' [IDS 1981].
As is mentioned there the Chilean 'Chicago boys' received this
name because of their common adherence to 'monetarist'
doctrines acquired while studying at the University of Chicago
and were advised and visited by Chicago's two leading mone-
tarists - Professors Milton Friedman and Arnold Harberger.
Finance 1974, 1975]. They have been particularly
critical of high tariff barriers and other trade
restrictions, as well as the negative impact of these on
growth in national productivity. The Accelerated
DevelopmentReport[World Bank 1981:30] echoes this
critique in respect of industrialisation policies pursued
in SSA.
Since 1974 the Chilean Government has adopted a
comprehensive and drastic programme of trade
liberalisation. The central measure taken was that of
reducing tariffs from an average of 94 per cent in 1974
to an average of 10 per cent in 1979 [Foxley 1980]. As a
result, tariff protection in Chile is now probably the
lowest in the Third World. At the same time, direct
controls over imports were very rapidly dismantled in
Chile.
The Chilean policy of import liberalisation was
initiated at a time (1974/75) when the economy was
faced with very severe balance of payments problems.
In this sense the Chilean regime followed very closely
the recommendations which the World Bank is now
making for SSA. To quote the Report:
the 1978-80 deterioration in the terms of trade and
the prospect of further increases in the cost of
energy lends greater urgency to policy change. The
big changes needed are: correction of overvalued
exchange rates; improved price incentives; lower
and more uniform protection for industry; and
reduced use of direct controls.
{World Bank 198 1:30] - author's emphasis
The experience of Chile shows clearly that if the
economy is 'opened up' at a time of serious balance of
payments difficulties, the only way to reduce external
disequilibria in the short term is massive deflation,
unless very large net external finance is available. In
the Chilean case, official series show GDP declined by
14.3 per cent in 1975 and the rate of open
unemployment (yearly average) shot up from less than
five per cent in 1973 to 14.5 per cent in 1975. Even
though this was in part a response to the need to
reduce very high inflation, a very important factor
behind the policy reform was the attempt to reduce a
massive trade deficit in the short term exclusively by
reducing aggregate demand and devaluation. If the
Chilean Government had, when experiencing a severe
crisis in its balance of payments, postponed import
liberalisation (or yven temporarily increased pro-
tection) then the cost in terms of decreased output and
employment would have been much smaller [Foxley
1980]. In fact, several less developing countries which
were best able to sustain growth rates in the mid-l970s
(eg Brazil and South Korea), did so in part by
responding to severe foreign exchange difficulties by
temporarily increasing protection [Griffith-Jones
1981b]. Governments would on this count be
particularly ill-advised to initiate a programme of
import liberalisation at a time when balance of
payments difficulties are as severe as they are in most
SSA countries at present. In this situation, if trade
liberalisation is deemed desirable it would make more
sense to apply measures which increase the profit-
ability of exports without creating a direct squeeze on
import substitutes. These could include selective export
incentives or a reduction in tariffs on imported inputs
for export production.
The Chilean experience of import liberalisation since
1973 (as well as less drastic attempts which have been
made in neighbouring countries) also raises the
problem of creating long-term contradictions. It is
interesting to note that the problems of this policy in
Chile were initially raised by opponents of the present
regime, but criticism has now become more
widespread, both on a national and international
level. Indeed it is being voiced by former supporters or
sympathisers of the government and its economic
model. Some of the most severe criticisms of the
Chilean model to be published by the international
press have come from newspapers which enjoy close
links with international financial circles. Thus a 1982
article in the Financial Times was entitled 'Chile's
economic problems mount: free market policies under
stress'. Another very critical piece published in the
Wall Street Journal in the same year was headed
'Frayed miracle: Chile's economy is troubled'. The
spread of criticism of the Chilean economic model to
'respectable' circles such as these surely implies that it
is becoming increasingly clear that this type of model
is not only socially unfair, but that it also contains
economic and financial contradictions, which increas-
ingly undermine its viability.
The adoption of extreme free market policies (of
which trade liberalisation was an important element)
has to date brought consequences such as a
deterioration in income distribution, sacrifices in
output growth, a process of de-industrialisation -
reflected in a decline in the participation of industry in
total output and a large increase in the rate of
unemployment (which according to official Chilean
figures, shot up to 19 per cent in March 1982, and
which has since 1973 been well above historical
averages). This economic model has also implied an
increase in the propensity to import, so that whenever
growth in the economy picks up (as it did in the
1977/80 period) a trade deficit emerges of a much
larger magnitude in real terms than existed before
trade liberalisation was introduced.
The primary concern of the international press - and
of the international banks - is that such large trade
deficits can only be handled if net external finance is
available on a continual and massive scale (as
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occurred in the Chilean case during 1977-8 1). Once
sources of external finance cease to be forthcoming on
such a large scale, as appears increasingly likely in
Chile, the main option is recession (in Chile since 1981
more elegantly called 'automatic adjustment'),
because direct measures such as import controls or
increased economic activity by the state are
inconsistent with the orthodox model.
In the case of SSA, the option of massive net external
finance clearly does not exist. Private banks are not
currently willing to lend large sums to these countries
and the prospects for substantially increased aid are
rather gloomy. The pursuit of policies which entail
'opening up' the economy (such as a rapid reduction of
tariffs and of direct controls on imports) would be
potentially even more damaging in the African context
in the l980s than in the Southern Cone of Latin
America in the mid- and late 1970s, as the resulting
increased trade deficits could not be financed, but
would have to be compressed through recessionary
measures. Given the low incomes of large sections of
the African population, the amount of social and
economic hardship this type of policy would cause
would be far larger than that which has occurred in the
Southern Cone of Latin America.
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